Ten outbreaks of waterborne acute gastroenteritis (AGE) have been investigated in France since 1998. These outbreaks have affected populations of over 1,000 people, with generally high attack rates. The causal agents have been identified in six of these events. Aetiologies involved mainly noroviruses and Cryptosporidium sp. The point of entry of the contamination was located in the distribution network in five outbreaks (waste water backflows in four cases and one case of contamination induced by maintenance work) and at the water collection facilities in five other cases. Once the outbreak was detected, epidemiological and environmental investigations and crisis management followed wellestablished procedures. Further progress in public health surveillance will depend on more complete and rapid detection and reporting. Automated analysis of health insurance data on the reimbursement of drugs for AGE should help make detection more complete. Improved reactivity depends primarily on the operator immediately reporting incidents that indicate a possible massive contamination of the water network to health authorities -in particular complaints from the population, which are the only early-warning alerts in the case of waste water backflows.
INTRODUCTION
Waterborne infectious diseases are a major public health problem in developing countries (Huttly 1990) , but events that occurred in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (MacKenzie et al. 1994) , and Walkerton, Ontario (Hrudey et al. 2003) ,
show that waterborne outbreaks can also take place in developed countries and may have a major impact on public health. Estimating the burden of waterborne disease outbreaks is difficult, however, since many go undetected.
At the local level, investigating disease outbreaks is crucial for the implementation of appropriate control measures and prevention of further outbreaks. At the national level, monitoring outbreaks and accidental contamination of drinking water distribution systems, and particularly their causes, makes it possible to prioritize preventive actions and to create better conditions for detecting and investigating outbreaks. 
METHODS
We analysed all available documents concerning waterborne outbreaks investigated between 1998 and 2006: scientific and technical papers (Deshayes & Schmitt 2001; Guyonnet & Claudet 2002; , published reports (see Appendix) and internal reports of InVS.
Available information on earlier outbreaks was too limited to be included. The selection of the different outbreaks examined was based on the level of evidence linking them with drinking water. Several systems based on epidemiological, environmental and microbiological criteria have been proposed for assessing the causal role of water in a disease outbreak (Tillett et al. 1998; Blackburn et al. 2004) . We opted for the system proposed by (Blackburn et al. 2004 ) and used by the Center for Disease Control in the USA (Table 1) . Only class I, II or III outbreaks are included in this analysis. For each outbreak we reviewed the investigation procedures: (i) epidemiological investigations; (ii) environmental investigations focusing on the causal factors of the outbreak (environmental, technical or human); and (iii) microbiological analyses of the clinical specimens (principally faeces) and water samples. These investigations yielded information regarding the population exposed, the epidemiological characteristics of the outbreak (period, area and population affected), the causes of contamination, the aetiologic agents, as well as the way the outbreak was reported and the health management actions that followed.
RESULTS

Outbreak selection
Since the creation of the InVS in 1998, ten outbreaks of waterborne acute gastroenteritis (AGE) have been 
2006
) was used in the analytical studies: 'Diarrheal illness (three or more loose stools in a 24-hour period) and/or vomiting'. For the descriptive studies based on the general practitioners' (GPs') questioning (Table 2) , either the simplified Foodnet definition was used or the diagnosis of AGE was made by the GP without fixed criteria.
The InVS operates a mandatory reporting-based surveillance system for food borne outbreaks, which includes outbreaks due to contaminated water. Over the period 1996 -2005, 5,847 food borne outbreaks were reported, but only 33 were suspected to be linked to tap water (Delmas et al. 2006) . Out of the ten selected outbreaks, only two were pinpointed by this system. The others were classified as category IV following the Blackburn et al. (2004) classification. Seven of the ten outbreaks included in the study display the highest level of likelihood of waterborne transmission according to Blackburn's classification, whereas three meet the class III conditions. In the other three outbreaks, the epidemiological investigations were limited and their waterborne nature, although highly probable, could not be proven formally. We excluded from this study an outbreak of viral infections (rotavirus, norovirus) that took place at the winter sports resort of Serre Chevalier (Hautes-Alpes) in January 2002. Waterborne transmission was initially suspected on the basis of recurrent faecal (a) F þ : sample positive for faecal contamination indicators (E. coli or Enterococci); P NS : pathogens not searched; P neg : no pathogen identified; P þ : pathogens identified in stool specimens; Pþþ: pathogens in stool indistinguishable from pathogens in water by molecular biology.
(b) d/nd: tap water drinker vs. non drinker; d/b: during vs. before the outbreak; i/o: inside vs. outside the outbreak area; o/e: observed vs. expected according to GP national surveillance (Boussard et al. 1996) . (c) If two signals are mentioned, they are given in the order of occurrence and the one which resulted in the alert is underscored. Table 1 . (e) See also Appendix. Abbreviations: Cl, chlorine; Cl biox, chlorine bioxid; DS, descriptive study; GP, general practitioner; NA, non available; WWTP, waste water treatment plant.
contamination of the supply network. However, the epidemiological investigations showed that practically all cases were secondary cases, contracted through contact with other infected people or through a contaminated environment (nursery), and there was no epidemiological evidence supporting a causal link with water.
Type of investigations carried out
Environmental investigations were systematically carried out. Faecal samples were analysed in nine outbreaks. Water samples were analysed for specific pathogens in six outbreaks. 
Exposed population and magnitude of the outbreak
The size of the exposed populations (Table 2) ranged from 1,100 (Dracy-le-Fort) to 60,000 (Strasbourg). The estimated number of AGE cases varied between 200 (Vesoul) and 2,600 (Gourdon). The total number of cases reached at least 9,000, of which about 70 were hospitalized. No fatal cases were recorded. Where age-specific data were available, the highest incidence was observed in children under five years old. At no time did we note a gender-related difference in the incidence rate.
The AR ranged from 5% in Vesoul to 51% in Dracy-le- Six of the investigated outbreaks spread rapidly with a maximum delay of 2 days between the first cases of AGE and the epidemic peak. For four other outbreaks, the dynamic was slower with a delay ranging from 5 to 10 days. The duration of the ascending phase of the outbreak depended on several factors, some of which were well documented (pathogenic agent, point of entry of the contamination, see Table 2 ) and others less so (distribution of the pathogen concentrations during the exposure period).
The contamination at the origin of the outbreaks
Nine of the ten outbreaks occurred in areas supplied with treated ground water, and one (Pulligny) with treated river water. In seven water systems, the treatment was limited to disinfection. In three water systems, water was filtered in addition to disinfection. In five outbreaks the contamination entered the water supply distribution network itself, whereas in the other five outbreaks the treatment capacities did not cope with the raw water contamination. Among the latter, one source was river water and four were highly vulnerable aquifers: two karstic aquifers, one small mountain aquifer and one alluvial aquifer known for its poor protection. In two outbreaks, heavy rains resulted in surface runoff that contaminated the source. In the Apprieu area, rain caused a waste water treatment facility to overflow into the river as well as the submersion of the borehole located downstream in the alluvial aquifer. The contamination persisted in the tap water, indicating the absence or failure of adequate water treatment. In one outbreak water was not treated at all, and in the other four outbreaks the treatment was limited to a simple chlorination, which is inadequate against parasites and viruses at the chlorination levels used in France. In two outbreaks the disinfection mechanism had broken down, one such outbreak allowing further exposure of supplied people to pathogenic bacteria (Gourdon).
Considering the five cases of contamination that occurred within the distribution network, four were due to waste water backflows and the fifth (Strasbourg) was the consequence of maintenance work on a water pipe. Backflows were caused by the joint occurrence of: (i) illegal and unprotected connections between a 'soiled' water network and a drinking water network (in three outbreaks, lack of a backflow preventer on the connecting pipe, and in one instance an non-functioning appliance); and (ii) inappropriate operations resulting in excessive pressure in the soiled water network. In three cases, the soiled water was urban waste water treatment plant effluent.
Aetiology and water microbiology
Faecal specimens were analysed in nine outbreaks. A single causal agent was found in six of these (noroviruses in three outbreaks and Cryptosporidium in the other three cases), while two outbreaks involved two agents (Cryptosporidium þ Campylobacter and Campylobacter þ rotavirus).
Faecal contamination of the tap water was evidenced in all nine outbreaks, with indicator bacteria Escherichia coli (E. coli) or enterococci identified in samples taken shortly before or during the outbreak. In six outbreaks water samples were examined for specific pathogens. In five outbreaks, the causal agent identified in the faecal samples was also found in the water samples. In four outbreaks, the strains identified in faecal and water samples were typed and compared using molecular biology and were found to be indistinguishable. Considering all ten outbreaks, reporting took place on average 5 days after the beginning of the outbreak. The delay was shorter when the signal that motivated the official alert was environmental (average delay 1 day after the onset of the outbreak) rather than medical (8 days). In four out of five outbreaks, the reporting of an excess of AGE cases coincided with the peak of the outbreak or the following day. In the extreme case of Pulligny, the outbreak was detected 9 days after its peak. Even though environmental signals were reported earlier than public health signals, alert-inducing environmental reports tended to coincide with the epidemic peak (3/5), or at best with the beginning of the outbreak (2/5).
These delays were due to the nature of the signal; that is, substandard bacteriological water analyses, the results of which are obtained by culture after a 2-day incubation period.
Control measures
In all cases, the health authority officer took steps to restrict tap water consumption on the day the signal was reported, but the water supply was never cut off. In two instances, the water supply operator, on his own initiative, issued a public announcement informing the population that the water was safe (Divonne-les-Bains, on the day before the epidemic peaked) or that the restrictions had been lifted, in contradiction to the information issued by the health authorities (Arc 1800).
The emergency steps taken to clean the water network involved chlorine shocks and flushing of the pipes. A complete purge was necessary in the case of contamination by Cryptosporidium, on which chlorine is inactive. This operation was particularly lengthy and delicate in Dracy-leFort because of the complexity of the water distribution system there: a meshed network alternatively gravity-fed by several reservoirs located at the periphery of the network and pump-fed from the treatment plant.
The actual steps taken to prevent recurrences are not precisely known, since they were implemented after publication of the investigation reports. Of ten documented AGE outbreaks, additional treatments (UV disinfection)
were imposed on the operator in the case of two cryptosporidiosis outbreaks, even though one of them did not involve contamination of the source (Divonne-lesBains). Physical protection of the borehole from flooding was advised in the case of Apprieu, and a river banking project is currently being considered.
DISCUSSION Comparison of outbreak descriptive data
Comparability of impacts and risks
Comparing impacts expressed as total number of cases or AR is difficult since the case definitions may differ according to clinical characteristics and to the investigator's territorial and temporal delimitation of the outbreak. Epidemiological investigations conducted in France usually restrict public health impact assessment to the enumeration of AGE cases that seek treatment, which underestimates the number of symptomatic cases. In the three outbreaks for which population surveys were carried out 52% (Gourdon), 54%
(Dracy-le-Fort) and 30% (Apprieu) of the sick consulted a doctor. The proportion of people seeking medical care is known to vary according to the severity of the illness, that is, according to the pathogen and physical state of the infected person, but also according to social factors such as level of education (Tam et al. 2003) . This complicates any attempt to deduct the actual number of symptomatic cases from the number of cases that seek medical care.
Estimating the incidence of AGE also depends on the geographical delimitation of the exposed population when defining cases. The AR may be artificially lowered if the presumed area of exposure exceeds the area actually supplied with contaminated water. In the case of contamination by back siphonage the fraction of the supplied population exposed to the contaminated water often remains unknown. This probably explains the low AR (5%) estimated for the Vesoul outbreak; a large area was considered to have been exposed whereas the contamination probably occurred only in a small part of this area.
The temporal delimitation of an outbreak is determined by comparing the incidence rate during the outbreak with baseline data from non-epidemic situations. Since there are no fixed criteria , the beginning and end of an outbreak may be estimated differently, in particular the latter, which for some pathogens can be obscured by cases with a long incubation period or secondary cases.
The estimation of the RR associated with exposure to drinking water not only depends on the way cases are defined but also requires the risk to be defined for exposed and non-exposed persons. Four options coexist in the investigations considered: (i) the risk observed in persons who say they do not drink tap water (cohort studies); (ii) the risk observed in control areas at the time of the outbreak;
(iii) the risk observed in the exposed area before the outbreak; or (iv) the expected risk estimated from data sources such as the GPs' sentinel surveillance network (Boussard et al. 1996) . Method (iv) introduces a substantial uncertainty regarding the estimation of the RR, due to the natural variability of the incidence rate in endemic situations. Definition (i) cannot give results comparable to those derived from definitions (ii) and (iii) since exposure is defined differently (drinking tap water as against residence in the contaminated area). Definition (i) moreover introduces classification errors due to the existence of unrecognized exposures to tap water that tend to result in an underestimation of RR. In Dracy-le-Fort, for example, given the contamination level of the tap water with Cryptosporidium (estimated at around 1,000 infectious oocysts per litre), using water to wash vegetables or brush teeth could have been infective, but was not classified in exposure.
International comparison
The comparison and interpretation of results from different countries is impeded by differences in outbreak definitions, epidemiological and microbiological investigation procedures and time frames used for recording data. Reviews of waterborne outbreaks (enteric pathogens) have been published for the United States (Kramer et al. 1996; Levy et al. 1998; Barwick et al. 2000; Lee et al. 2002; Blackburn et al. 2004 ),
England and Wales (E&W) (Smith et al. 2006) and Canada (Schuster et al. 2005) . In Canada, the inclusion criteria and study period differ too much from our own data to allow valid comparisons to be made. The paper on England and Wales is essentially focused on the pathogens involved in the outbreaks, whereas those concerning the United States also look into environmental and technology-related determinants.
Using available data for the period 1998-2006, the average incidence rates of investigated waterborne out- In E&W, bacteria can represent up to 60% of aetiologies in private facilities as against only 4% in public ones (Smith et al. 2006) . Such a discrepancy is most likely explained by the absence or failure of disinfection in private facilities. In properly equipped and operated water treatment systems, parasites emerge as the dominant aetiology. Giardia is found more often in North America than in Europe.
The frequency distribution of outbreaks according to the point of entry of the contamination in the drinking water system does not differ significantly in the USA and
France. French data are, however, too scarce to ascertain whether the rise in the proportion of network-originating contaminations documented in the USA also occurs in France. In contrast to the French situation, there is in the USA as in England and Wales a real capacity to detect, investigate and report on outbreaks linked to small-scale distribution systems, even at the individual home level (Kramer et al. 1996; Levy et al. 1998; Barwick et al. 2000; Lee et al. 2002; Blackburn et al. 2004 ).
On Suppressing connections between drinking water networks and networks containing effluent from waste water treatment plants is the first priority for DDASS action to prevent backflow-related outbreaks. Since a capture -recapture study (Gallay et al. 2000) showed that fewer than 21% of the AGE cases due to food borne outbreaks (including waterborne outbreaks) are reported to health authorities, it can be assumed that the its sensitivity, the overall sensitivity of this system remains better (24 -43%) than reporting by GP, whereas its specificity is almost as good. A statistical power study which took into account both the overall sensitivity of the system and the imperfect mapping of the district areas (the smallest space unit for drug reimbursement data availability) by the drinking water service areas, has shown that this mechanism will be unable to pinpoint outbreaks occurring on distribution networks supplying less than 500 end-users and outbreaks associated with a RR related to living within the exposed area of less than about 10.
Nonetheless this limit concerns no more than 2.2% of the 
CONCLUSION
Whereas waterborne disease outbreaks have been better detected and investigated from 1998, further efforts are needed to achieve faster and more comprehensive reporting.
The systematic use of the drug-reimbursement database should facilitate the assessment of impacts on health, limited to the number of care-seeking AGE cases and, ultimately, the detection of outbreaks. However, this being a medical signal, detection will still be posterior to the emergence of disease.
The most promising source of improvement as regards reactivity -in order to halt exposure and prevent the development of the outbreak or limit the number of casesis to pay more attention to environmental signals, in particular complaints from the population suggesting tap water contamination.
